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What Scientists Know Is Not a Function
of What Scientists Know
P. D. Magnus*y
There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense ðthe separate opin-
ions of individual scientistsÞ and a collective sense ðthe state of the disciplineÞ. The lat-
ter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly
observed or reported. A function can be defined to map individual judgments onto an
aggregate judgment. I argue that such a function cannot effectively capture commu-
nity opinion, especially in cases that matter to us.
In one sense, ‘what scientists know’ just means the claims that are the de-
termination of our best science. Yet science is a collective enterprise; there
are many scientists who have individual and disparate beliefs. So ‘what sci-
entists know’, in another sense, means the omnibus composed of the epi-
stemic state of scientist 1, the epistemic state of scientist 2, and so on, for
the rest of the community. The phrase is ambiguous between a collective
and an individual meaning.
If we consult a scientific expert, either because we want to plan policy or
just because we are curious, we are typically interested in the collective
sense. We want to know what our best current science has to say about
the matter. And the expert we consult can differentiate the two senses, too.
She can relate what she as a particular scientist knows ðwhat she herself
thinks, where her sympathies lie in controversies, etc.Þ, but she can also
take a step back from those commitments to give her sense of what the
community consensus or dominant opinion is on the same matters. If it is
simply curiosity that has led us to consult an expert, this may be enough.
*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University at Albany,
SUNY, Albany, NY 12222; e-mail: pmagnus@fecundity.com.
yThanks to John Milanese, Heather Douglas, and Jon Mandle for comments on various parts
of this project.
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When policy hangs on the judgment, however, we want more than just
one expert’s report on the state of the entire field.
This distinction between their personal commitments and the state of
the field in their discipline is one that any scholar can make. If you think
ðas tradition has itÞ that only individuals can have beliefs in a strict sense,
then take the expression ‘opinion of the scientific community’ as a façon de
parler. If you think ðas Lynn Hankinson Nelson doesÞ that the community
rather than the individual knows in a strict sense, then suitably reinterpret
‘what an individual knows’ in terms of belief ðsee Nelson 1990Þ. The dis-
tinction I have in mind is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of social
epistemology. The question is simply how we could use consultation with
individuals to generate a composite, collective judgment.
Formal judgment aggregation offers a rigorous framework that seems
to provide what we want. In the abstract, it defines a function that takes in-
dividual scientists’ judgments as inputs and yields collective judgment as
an output. This assumes that the collective judgment of the scientific com-
munity depends on the separate individual judgments of the scientists—that
is, that what scientists know in the collective sense is a function of what sci-
entists know in the individual sense.
Taking a recent proposal by Hartmann, Pigozzi, and Sprenger ð2010Þ and
Hartmann and Sprenger ð2012Þ as an exemplar, I argue that judgment ag-
gregation does a poor job of representing what scientists know in the col-
lective sense. I survey several difficulties. The deepest stems from the fact
that judgments of fact necessarily involve ðperhaps implicitÞ value judg-
ments. Where values and risks might be contentious, this entails that indi-
vidual judgments cannot merely be inputs to a function. Judgment aggre-
gation is not enough.
1. The Majority and Premise-Majority Rules. As a judgment aggregation
procedure, one might naively survey scientists about factual matters and
take any answer given by the majority of scientists to reflect the state of
science. Of course, scientists would agree about a great many things that
are simply not within their purview. Physicists would say that Sacramento
is the capital of California, but that does not make it part of physics. So
the survey should be confined to matters that are properly scientific. The
survey must also include only legitimate scientists and exclude ignorant
rabble. These restrictions are somewhat slippery, but let’s accept them.
The naive procedure is a simple function from individual judgments to
an aggregate judgment: return the judgment endorsed by a majority of the
judges. Call this the majority rule.
The majority rule has the nice features that it treats every judge equally
and that it does not bias the conclusion toward one judgment or another.
Yet it suffers from what’s called the discursive dilemma: it can lead to in-
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consistent collective judgments, even if all the judges considered individ-
ually have consistent beliefs. In the following schematic example, there are
three judges: Alice, Bob, and Charles. Each has the consistent beliefs on the
matters P, Q, and ðP&QÞ indicated in the table below. The majority rule
yields the inconsistent combination of affirming P and Q but denying
ðP&QÞ.
P Q ðP&QÞ
Alice True False False
Bob False True False
Charles True True True
Majority True True False
1. The strategy of adding complications only as necessary can be applied generally to
decision problems. For example, intransitive preferences wreck dominance reasoning.
Yet one might presumptively employ dominance reasoning until one actually faces a
case in which there are intransitive preferences.
2. Since Hartmann et al. are thinking about the general problem of judgment aggrega-
tion, rather than the problem of expert elicitation, these are objections to the application
of the rule rather than to the rule as such.
The nice features of majority rule seem like desiderata for a judgment
aggregation rule, but avoiding the discursive dilemma is another such de-
sideratum. A good deal of ink has been spilled specifying precisely the de-
siderata and proving that they are together inconsistent. However, evenwhen
it can be proven that a set of desiderata cannot be satisfied in all cases, they
may still be jointly satisfied in some instances. Although the majority rule
can lead to contradiction, it does not do so in every case. As a practical mat-
ter, we might begin by trying out a simple rule ðlike majorityÞ and add so-
phistication only if the actual community has judgments like those in the
schematic example.1 Even so, more sophisticated rules would be needed for
corner cases.
Hartmann et al. ð2010Þ and Hartmann and Sprenger ð2012Þ develop a
judgment aggregation rule specifically to escape the discursive dilemma.
Their procedure involves polling judges only regarding matters of indepen-
dent evidence. For matters that are consequences of the evidence, the pro-
cedure derives consequences from the aggregated judgments. In the sim-
ple case given in the table above, for example, the procedure would affirm
P and Q ðbecause each is affirmed by a majorityÞ and also P&Q ðbecause
it is a consequence of P and QÞ. Call this the premise-majority rule. When
it can be applied, premise majority generates a consistent set of judgments.
There are several difficulties with premise majority, as a way of aggre-
gating expert scientific opinion.2 First, premise majority inevitably pro-
duces some determinate answer. As Brams, Kilgour, and Zwicker ð1998Þ
show, it is possible for a combination of separate elections to result in an
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overall outcome that would not be affirmed by any of the voters. More-
over, a judge’s inconsistency will necessarily be between some belief about
evidence and some belief about the consequences of the evidence—since
the evidence claims are stipulated to be independent—but premise major-
ity does not query beliefs about consequences at all. So it will generate
a consistent set of judgments even if many or all judges are inconsistent.
As such, premise majority will generate determinate results even when the
community is confused or fractured into competing camps. But, in consid-
ering scientific opinion, we certainly only want to say that there is some-
thing that ‘scientists know’ when there is a coherent scientific community.
Second, applying the rule requires a division between the judgments
that are evidence and the ones that are conclusions. As Fabrizio Cariani
notes, premise majority “requires us to isolate, for each issue, a distinguished
set of logically independent premises” ð2011, 28Þ. He constructs a case in-
volving three separate contentious claims and an agreed-on constraint, such
that any two of the three claims logically determines the third. It would be
arbitrary to treat two of the claims as evidence ðand so suitable for pollingÞ
and the third as a consequence ðand so fixed by inferenceÞ. The premise-
majority rule simply is not applicable in cases in which the line between
premises and conclusions is so fluid. This difficulty leads Cariani to con-
clude only that premise majority will sometimes be inapplicable, so he sug-
gests, “Different specific aggregation problems may call for different aggre-
gation rules” ð29Þ. Yet the problem is especially acute for scientific judgment,
because inference can be parsed at different levels. Individual measurements
like ‘35° at 1:07 a.m.’ are not the sort of thing that would appear in a scien-
tific publication; individual data points are unrepeatable and not something
about which you would query the whole community. Yet they do, of course,
play a role in inference. At the same time, scientists may take things like
the constancy of the speed of light to be evidence for a theory; the evidence
here is itself an inference from experiments and observations.3 Since we
might treat the same claims as premises or conclusions, in different contexts,
it is unclear what we would poll scientists about if we applied premise ma-
jority.
Third, premise majority is constructed for cases in which the conclu-
sion is a deductive consequence of the premises. In science, this is almost
never the case.4 Scientific inference is ampliative, and there is uncertainty
not only about which evidence statements to accept but also about which
inferences ought to be made on their basis.
3. There are different labels for these different levels. Trevor Pinch ð1985Þ calls them
observations of differing externality. James Bogen and James Woodward ð1988Þ distin-
guish data from phenomena.
4. I say “almost” because sufficiently strong background commitments can transform
an ampliative inference into a deduction from phenomena. Of course, we accept equiv-
alent inductive risk when we adopt the background commitments; cf. Magnus ð2008Þ.
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One might avoid this difficulty by including inferential relations among
the evidential judgments. To take a schematic case, judges could be asked
about R and ðR→ SÞ; if the majority affirms both, then premise majority
yields an affirmative judgment for S. This reply reflects what John Nor-
ton ð2003Þ calls a material theory of induction. The central idea is that
most of the inductive risk in ampliative inferences is shouldered by condi-
tional premises that Norton calls material postulates. Although material
postulates are often of the form ‘If R, then typically S’ rather than the stricter
R→ S, they nevertheless underwrite an inference from R to S. So one
might think that asking about material postulates would allow us to use the
premise-majority rule to aggregate scientific judgments.
This suggestion presumes that scientists can say, independently of ev-
erything else, whether the inference from R to S is appropriate. That is, it
assumes that material postulates can be evaluated on a ballot apart from
other matters. In the remainder of the article, I argue that this idealizes sci-
ence too much. Whether a scientific inference is appropriate must be in-
formed by more than just the particular evidence—the appropriate scien-
tific conclusion depends ðat least in many important casesÞ on the risks and
values involved.
In the next section, I spell out more clearly the way in which inference
can be entangled with values and risk. In the subsequent section, I return
to it as a problem for premise majority. As we will see, it becomes a prob-
lem for more than just Hartmann et al.’s specific proposal. It is a problem
for any formal judgment aggregation rule whatsoever.
2. The James-Rudner-Douglas Thesis. Here is a quick argument for the
entanglement of judgment and values: there is a tension between different
epistemic duties. The appropriate balance between these duties is a mat-
ter of value commitments rather than a matter of transcendent rationality.
So making a judgment of fact necessarily depends on value commitments.
The argument goes back at least to William James, who puts the point
this way: “We must know the truth; and we must avoid error—these are our
first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two
ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws”
ð1896/1948, 99Þ. Although James has in mind personal matters of con-
science ðsuch as religious beliefÞ, Richard Rudner makes a similar argu-
ment for scientific judgment. Rudner argues that “the scientist must make
the decision that the evidence is sufficiently strong . . . to warrant the ac-
ceptance of the hypothesis. Obviously our decision regarding the evidence
and respecting how strong is ‘strong enough,’ is going to be a function of
the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in ac-
cepting or rejecting the hypothesis” ð1953, 2Þ.
The tension between finding truth and avoiding falsehood can be ex-
pressed as the trade-off between two kinds of error. Any particular test in-
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volves a trade-off between making the standards too permissive ðand so
mistakenly giving a positive answerÞ or making them too strict ðand so mis-
takenly giving a negative answerÞ. The former mistake is a false positive
or type I error; the latter, a false negative or type II error. There is an in-
evitable trade-off between the risk of each mistake, and so there is a point
at which the only way to reduce the risk of both is to collect more evi-
dence and perform more tests. Yet the decision to do so is itself a practical
as well as an epistemic decision. In any case, it leaves the realm of judg-
ment aggregation—having more evidence would mean having different sci-
ence, rather than discerning the best answer our current science has to a
question. As such, values come into play. Heather Douglas puts the point
this way: “Within the parameters of available resources and methods, some
choices must be made, and that choice should weigh the costs of false posi-
tives versus false negatives. Weighing these costs legitimately involves so-
cial, ethical, and cognitive values” ð2009, 104Þ.
Plotting a curve through these nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first-
century formulations, we call this the James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD the-
sis: anytime a scientist announces a judgment of fact, he or she is making
a trade-off between the risk of different kinds of error. This balancing act
depends on the costs of each kind of error, so scientific judgment involves
assessments of the value of different outcomes.5
The standard objection to the thesis is that responsible scientists should
not be making categorical judgments. They should never simply announce
‘P’ ðthe objection saysÞ but instead should say things like ‘The available
evidence justifies x% confidence in P’. This response fails to undercut the
thesis because procedures for assigning confidence levels also involve a
balance between different kinds of risk. This is clearest if the confidence
is given as an interval, like x6 e%. Error can be avoided, at the cost of
precision, by making e very large. Yet a tremendous interval, although safe,
is tantamount to no answer at all.
Justin Biddle and Eric Winsberg ð2010Þ give a substantially more subtle
reply to the standard objection. Regarding the specific case of climate mod-
eling, Biddle and Winsberg show that scientists’ estimates both of particu-
lar quantities and of confidence intervals depend on the histories of their
models. For example, the results are different if scientists model ocean dy-
namics and then add a module for ice formation rather than vice versa. The
history of a model reflects decisions about what was considered to be im-
portant enough to model first, and so it depends on prior value judgments.
But why should the JRD thesis have consequences for expert elicitation?
After all, James does not apply it to empirical scientific matters. He is
concerned with religious and personal matters, and he concludes merely
5. These three namesakes provide clear, prominent statements of the thesis, but of
course they are not alone; e.g., see Lemons, Shrader-Frechette, and Cranor ð1997Þ.
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that we should “respect one another’s mental freedom” ð1896/1948, 109Þ.
He does not apply it to scientific matters for which there is a community of
legitimate experts.
Rudner, who does apply the thesis to empirical judgments, neverthe-
less hopes that the requisite values might themselves be objective. What
we need, he concludes, is “a science of ethics” ð1953, 6Þ. Rudner calls this
a “task of stupendous magnitude,” but he is too optimistic. Searching for
an objective ethics in order to resolve the weight of values and risks is a
fool’s errand. We would enter a vicious circle: the judgments of ethical sci-
ence would need to be informed by the ethically correct values so as to prop-
erly balance inductive risks, but assurance that we have the correct values
would only be available as the product of ethical science. One might invoke
pragmatism and reflective equilibrium, but such invocations would not give
Rudner final or utterly objective values. If responsible judgment aggrega-
tion were to wait on an utterly objective, scientific ethics, then it would wait
forever.
Douglas accepts that the thesis matters for expert elicitation. So she con-
siders the concrete question of how to determine the importance of the rel-
evant dangers. She argues for an analytic-deliberative process that would
include both scientists and stakeholders ð2009, chap. 8Þ. Such a process
is required when the scientific question has a bearing on public policy, and
there are further conditions that must obtain in order for such processes
to be successful. For one, “policymakers ½must be fully committed to tak-
ing seriously the public input and advice they receive and to be guided by
the results of such deliberation.” For another, the public must be “en-
gaged and manageable in size, so that stakeholders can be identified and
involved” ð166Þ. Where there are too many stakeholders and scientists for
direct interaction, there can still be vigorous public examination of the
values involved. Rather than pretending that there is any all-purpose pro-
cedure, Douglas calls for “experiment with social mechanisms to achieve
a robust dialog and potential consensus about values” ð169Þ. Where con-
sensus is impossible, we can still try to elucidate and narrow the range of
options. Douglas’s approach is both a matter of policy ðtrying to increase
trust in science, rather than alienating policy makers and stakeholdersÞ and
a matter of normative politics ðclaiming that stakeholders’ values are ones
that scientists should take into considerationÞ. In cases in which these con-
cerns are salient, saying what scientists know will depend on more than
just the prior isolated judgments of scientists—it will depend, moreover, on
facts about the actual communities of scientists, policy makers, and stake-
holders.
Arguably, Douglas’s concerns will not be salient in all cases. Some sci-
ence is far removed from questions of policy. So the significance of the
JRD thesis may depend on the question being asked.
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3. Our Fallible Selves. I argued above that the premise-majority rule was
inapplicable in many scientific contexts because it only worked for cases
of deductive consequence. Formally, this worry could be resolved by ask-
ing scientists about which inferences would be justified; we poll them about
claims like ðE→ HÞ at the same time as we poll them about E. The JRD
thesis undercuts this formal trick. Where the judgment has consequences,
the inference itself is an action under uncertainty. So the appropriate infer-
ence depends on the values at stake. Schematically, whether one should
assent to ðE→ HÞ depends on the risks involved in inferring H from E.
Concretely, questions of science that matter for policy are not entirely sep-
arable from questions of the policy implications.
If we merely poll scientists, then we will be accepting whatever judg-
ments accord with their unstated values. We instead want the procedure to
reflect the right values, which in a democratic society means including com-
munities effected by the science. Importantly, this does not mean that stake-
holders get to decide matters of fact themselves; they merely help deter-
mine how the risks involved in reaching a judgment should be weighed.
Nor does it mean that politicized scientific questions should be answered by
political means; climate scientists can confidently identify general trends
and connections, even allowing for disagreement about the values involved.
What it does mean is that scientists cannot provide an account that is value
neutral in all its precise details.6
This is fatal to premise majority as a method of determining what sci-
entists know collectively. Moreover, it is fatal to any judgment aggregation
rule that treats judges merely as separate inputs to an algorithm. The prob-
lem extends to practical policies of expert elicitation, insofar as they are
procedures for enacting judgment aggregation rules. Where there are im-
portant values at stake that scientists are not taking into account or where
the value commitments of scientists are different from those of stakehold-
ers, the current judgments of individual scientists cannot just be taken as
givens.
So what should we do? It is worth distinguishing two kinds of cases.
First, in some cases, the problem could be ameliorated by an analytic-
deliberative process that leads the scientists to consider the relevant values.
However, the appropriate mechanisms are not ones that we can derive a
priori. As Douglas argues, we need to experiment with different possibil-
ities ð2009, 169Þ. There is not likely to be one universally applicable pro-
cess. It will depend on facts about the communities involved. Moreover,
the inference from social experiments in deliberation will itself be an in-
ductive inference about a question that effects policy. So the inference de-
6. Douglas ð2009, esp. chap. 6Þ provides an excellent discussion of how ðwhat I have
calledÞ the JRD thesis is compatible with objectivity.
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pends importantly on value judgments about the inductive risks involved,
and that means an analytic-deliberative process will be required. It would
be a mistake to hope, in parallel with Rudner’s appeal to a science of ethics,
for an objective set of procedural norms. How best to resolve metalevel
judgment about experiments in social arrangements is as much a contingent
matter as how to socially arrange object-level expert consultation.
Second, in other cases, it might be impossible for scientists to consider
the relevant values by deliberation. Recall the example given by Biddle
and Winsberg that the results of climate models depend on the sequence in
which the modules were developed. Merely recognizing that different val-
ues would have led researchers to develop modules in a different order
will not tell us what to believe because we do not know what different re-
sult that alternate pathway would have generated. What we want is some
way of estimating the difference without having to start over and enact a
different historical trajectory. It may be possible to do this at least in a
qualitative way, for example, to estimate the direction or order of magni-
tude of various differences. But the ways of doing this will be local and
contingent. They will probably also depend on prior value-laden choices.
In both kinds of cases, the solution is a turn to methods for assessing
methodologies—for experimenting with analytic-deliberative procedures
ðin the former casesÞ or for evaluating the path dependence of object meth-
odologies ðin the latterÞ. The JRD thesis can apply as much to these meta-
methdologies as to object methodologies. But we start with the best pro-
cesses we can muster up now, and we try to improve them going forward.
Minimally, we can say that future improvements should not elide the role
of values, as formal judgment aggregation functions do, but explicitly ac-
commodate it.
REFERENCES
Biddle, Justin, and Eric Winsberg. 2010. “Value Judgements and the Estimation of Uncertainty
in Climate Modelling.” In New Waves in Philosophy of Science, ed. P. D. Magnus and Jacob
Busch, 172–97. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Bogen, James, and James Woodward. 1988. “Saving the Phenomena.” Philosophy of Science 97
ð3Þ: 303–52.
Brams, Steven J., D. Marc Kilgour, and William S. Zwicker. 1998. “The Paradox of Multiple
Elections.” Social Choice and Welfare 15 ð2Þ: 211–36.
Cariani, Fabrizio. 2011. “Judgment Aggregation.” Philosophy Compass 6 ð1Þ: 22–32.
Douglas, Heather E. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press.
Hartmann, Stephan, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Jan Sprenger. 2010. “Reliable Methods of Judgment
Aggregation.” Journal for Logic and Computation 20:603–17.
Hartmann, Stephan, and Jan Sprenger. 2012. “Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Track-
ing the Truth.” Synthese 187 ð1Þ: 209–21.
James, William. 1896/1948. “The Will to Believe.” In Essays in Pragmatism, ed. Alburey Castell,
88–109. New York: Hafner.
848 P. D. MAGNUS
This content downloaded from 169.226.156.075 on February 22, 2016 06:49:37 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Lemons, John, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, and Carl Cranor. 1997. “The Precautionary Principle:
Scientific Uncertainty and Type I and Type II Errors.” Foundations of Science 2 ð2Þ: 207–36.
Magnus, P. D. 2008. “Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference.” International
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 ð3Þ: 303–15.
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. 1990.Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Norton, John D. 2003. “A Material Theory of Induction.” Philosophy of Science 70 ð4Þ: 647–70.
Pinch, Trevor. 1985. “Towards an Analysis of Scientific Observation: The Externality and Eviden-
tial Significance of Observational Reports in Physics.” Social Studies of Science 15:3–36.
Rudner, Richard. 1953. “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.” Philosophy of Sci-
ence 20 ð1Þ: 1–6.
WHAT SCIENTISTS KNOW 849
This content downloaded from 169.226.156.075 on February 22, 2016 06:49:37 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
